Environmental Defense Institute
Troy, ID 83871-0220

May 26, 2004

Public Comment on Remediation Plan for Department of Energy (DOE)
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC)
Pit-4 Remediation

Submitted on Behalf of the Environmental Defense Institute
by Chuck Broscious

I. Summary

The Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) appreciates the opportunity to comment for the official record on the proposed RWMC Pit-4 remediation plan. ⁽¹⁾ If additional information becomes available, EDI reserves the right to submit additional supplemental comments. ⁽²⁾

Generally, this Plan is yet another "penny-wise-dollar foolish" project because it fails to commit to serious buried waste exhumation that would mitigate the continued migration of hazardous and radioactive waste into the Snake River Plane Aquifer.

The uncertainty in waste characterization (the process of determining what is in the waste) is so huge, that DOE credibly must commit to exhuming all the Pit-4 waste and evaluate it drum by drum.- box by box. Given the forty years of its internment (and random dumping that itself compromised containers), it is likely all the waste is just a corroded mixed up mess! DOE acknowledges that waste containers were just randomly dumped into Pit-4 (as opposed to stacking the containers) and it is this period when records/data have the biggest information gaps. Therefore, DOE's Plan to exhume only a small (21%) portion of the waste (in a specific area) is not credible, and categorically deficient. Given the available inadequate monitoring and disposal data, DOE simply offers no convincing evidence to the public to support such a limited exhumation project for Pit-4.

In March 2003, DOE lost a desperate legal attempt to renege on its 1995 Settlement Agreement with the State of Idaho to remove all alpha low-level, transuranic, and high-level waste from INEEL. DOE wanted to limit its obligation to removing only "stored" waste and leave the "buried" waste permanently in place at INEEL. U.S. Federal District Court Judge Lodge ruled in favor of Idaho and stated that "all means all, stored and buried waste" and ordered that "the United States remove all transuranic waste located at INEEL." ⁽³⁾ [emphasis added]

As discussed below, DOE also launched another legal attempt to eliminate its statutory obligation (under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act) to remove all the high-level waste in tanks at INEEL and other DOE sites. Although DOE was able to have its appeal heard in the Ninth Circuit, a ruling has yet to be issued as of this writing. ⁽⁴⁾

On May 21, 2004 DOE launched a legislative initiative that would allow DOE to avoid its current legal obligations. Essentially, DOE wants the Republican controlled Congress to block the Federal Court's intrusion on its operations. In an amendment to Department of Defense authorization bill (secretly attached by Republican leadership) and authored by Senator Lindsey Graham that would amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to allow DOE to re-classify high-level waste. The bill was narrowly approved in the House but delayed in the Senate (5/21/04).

DOE is the federal agency (tasked with managing the most deadly operations on the planet) that based on its legal and legislative record puts public health and safety in a lower priority than saving money and will go to extreme lengths to avoid compliance with the law.

The bottom line is that this Pit-4 Plan is categorically deficient under federal regulatory requirements (discussed below), and lacks the requisite commitment by DOE to "get the waste out of Idaho."

II. Pit-4 Remediation Plan Comments

DOE's Plan states that Pit-4 is a "non-time-critical removal action." [page 1] The fact that this buried waste at the RWMC generally and Pit-4 specifically is migrating into the Snake River Aquifer since the Pit-4 waste interment in 1963, by any observer, represents an immediate hazard. This "non-time-critical" designation is not based on credible risk-based assessments given the documentation available showing RWMC waste migration into the Snake River Plane Aquifer.

DOE, state, and EPA reports on aquifer contamination resulting from RWMC buried waste go back several decades in addition to the ever-present flooding risks. ⁽⁵⁾ Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations on "disposal site suitability requirements for land disposal" [10 CFR 61.50(a)(5 through 7) state in pertinent part:

"The disposal site must be generally well drained and free of areas of flooding or frequent ponding. Waste disposal shall not take place in a 100-year flood plain, coastal high-hazard area or wetland, as defined in Executive Order 11988, `Floodplain Management Guidelines.' (6) Upstream drainage areas must be minimized to decrease the amount of runoff which could erode or inundate waste disposal units. (7) The disposal site must provide sufficient depth to the water table that ground water intrusion, perennial or otherwise, into the waste will not occur." [emphasis added]

The fact that the RWMC lies some forty feet below the elevation of the Big Lost River, immediately to the north-east, and the fact that the RWMC has experienced numerous floods in the recent past (1952, 1962, 1969, and 1982), would disqualify this site for land disposal of any waste - even municipal garbage under RCRA Subtitle D or Subtitle C hazardous waste disposal.

DOE offers no apparent monitoring data to justify the limit of only 21% of the Pit-4 waste as opposed to exhuming the entire Pit-4 contents of 1,600,000 cubic feet of waste. [page 6] By comparison, DOE conducted a systematic probe assessment of Pit-9 that showed significantly higher estimates of the radioactivity of the waste than the previous estimates using the same data used in the Pit-4 estimates. ⁽⁶⁾

DOE fails to acknowledge two previous successful RWMC buried waste retrieval projects in 1974 and 1976 nor are other more extensive Subsurface Disposal Area waste inventory reports acknowledged. ⁽⁷⁾ There simply is no credible excuse for DOE's dragging its collective feet in getting on with this essential remediation work other than simply not wanting to spend the money required. This "limited" 21% removal of Pit-4 waste is clearly more cost cutting and stalling that must be challenged! There is no dispute that the Rocky Flats waste dumped at the RWMC represents an immediate hazard. DOE, however, fails to acknowledge equally significant onsite reactor waste from on-sit INEEL programs such as Initial Engine Test (IET), SNAP-TRAN, SL-1 dumped at the RWMC during the period Pit-4 was open (1963-1967). This waste included reactors, reactor parts, irradiated fuel. ⁽⁸⁾ Mush of this waste would also be legally classified as "Class-C" and "greater than Class-C Low-level waste" that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations specifically prohibit disposal in shallow land burial such as Pit-4. NRC regulations on "greater than Class C" state that waste be interned in engineered deep geologic repositories due to the extreme radiological hazard this waste presents. NRC regulations on "land disposal of radioactive waste" in "near surface disposal facilities" [10 CFR 61.55(a)(2)] states in pertinent part:

"Class-C [low-level] waste is waste that not only must meet more rigorous requirements on waste form to ensure stability but also requires additional measures at the disposal facility to protect against inadvertent intrusion. The physical form and characteristics of Class C waste must meet both the minimum and stability requirements set forth in Sec. 61.56. (iv) Waste that is not generally acceptable for near-surface disposal is waste for which form and disposal methods must be different, and in general more stringent, than those specified for Class C waste. In the absence of specific requirements in this part, such waste must be disposed of in a geologic repository as defined in part 60 or 63 of this chapter unless proposals for disposal of such waste in a disposal site licensed pursuant to this part are approved by the Commission." [emphasis added] ⁽⁹⁾

Moreover, the State of Idaho stipulated in the Settlement Agreement with DOE, that "low-level alpha waste" (greater than 10 and less than 100 nCi/gm ) also be removed from INEEL. The 1995 Settlement Agreement states: "1. DOE agrees to treat spent fuel, high-level waste, and transuranic wastes in Idaho requiring treatment so as to permit ultimate disposal outside the State of Idaho. 2. DOE shall as soon as practicable, commence the procurement of a treatment facility [facility] at INEL for the treatment of mixed waste, transuranic waste and alpha-emitting mixed low-level waste [treatable waste]." ⁽¹⁰⁾

DOE's misguided "targeting Rocky Flats waste" ONLY has no credible risk management basis. It can only be considered ludicrous for DOE to rely on "package labeling or distinctive packaging to identify non-targeted waste" that will be left in place. [page 11] This waste has been in the ground for over forty-years. This reliance on "labeling" is indicative of how ungrounded this plan actually is, and ignores the previous (1970's) retrieval projects (noted above) that found the containers completely compromised and labeling non-existent.

DOE's Plan offers so may caveats to what waste will be "targeted" for extraction, that the public is left with little or no assurance that this is a serious retrieval operation. [page 11]

Moreover, DOE's Plan provides for "thermal treatment" of some extracted waste to remove volitle organic compounds (VOC) that currently are prohibited for disposal at the transuranic disposal site (WIPP) in New Mexico.[page 16] The public is justifiably concerned that this "thermal treatment" means "incineration," and DOE's lack of full disclosure on this crucial part of the project feeds the public's lack of confidence about the impact on environmental, health and safety issues. [pages 16 and 28]

Additional uncertainty is pervasive on DOE reliance on DOE Order 435.1 that is currently being litigated by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). U.S. Federal Court found DOE Order 435.1 illegal under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, however DOE has appealed that ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Six states have filed a joint Amicus Brief in support of NRDC case. ⁽¹¹⁾

III. What is in the RWMC Buried Waste?

INEEL, located near Idaho Falls, Idaho, is a federal nuclear reservation owned by DOE. INEEL is only one segment of the federal government's nuclear weapons production complex.

The INEEL over its fifty-year operating history has generated on-site or received via off-site shipments, significant quantities of high-level radioactive spent nuclear fuel waste (i.e. Nuclear Navy spent nuclear fuel), and transuranic (TRU) waste (i.e. DOE's Rocky Flats Site) from fabrication of plutonium nuclear bomb components.

INEEL uses many sites for permanent disposal of transuranic waste including injection wells into the aquifer and unlined percolation ponds. ⁽¹²⁾ The largest and most significant INEEL disposal site is the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Subsurface Disposal Area (SDA), where Pit-4 is located, and the Argonne National Laboratory-West, Radioactive Scrap and Waste Facility, located on the INEEL site. ⁽¹³⁾ Internal DOE documents gained by EDI through Freedom of Information Act requests and other state and federal agency administrative records, show more than ninety (90) metric tons of high-level irradiated reactor fuel was dumped in the RWMC. EDI has provided an itemized listing of this irradiated reactor fuel interned at the RWMC SDA. ⁽¹⁴⁾

DOE's Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado shipped substantial quantities of plutonium waste to INEEL. EDI's investigations into these Rocky Flats shipments show that considerably more plutonium was shipped to INEEL than is disclosed by the parties to this case. EDI's Amicus Brief Exhibit No. 2 documents EDI's contention and further shows that the concentrations of plutonium and highly enriched uranium waste dumped in the SDA poses a significant criticality hazard. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Flooding of the RWMC and other radioactive waste disposal sites poses a significant hazard due to contaminates being flushed through the soil column to the aquifer. EDI's Amicus Brief Exhibit No. 3 shows the hydro-geologic vulnerability of the INEEL buried waste sites including the RWMC to flooding, incidents, which have already occurred in 1962, 1969, and 1982, as well as Idaho Nuclear Technology and Environmental Center (INTEC) formerly known as the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) where DOE plans to permanently dispose of HLW and TRU waste.

Buried or otherwise dumped radioactive transuranic waste is currently contaminating the Snake River Aquifer. U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports show plutonium in aquifer wells some twenty miles south of the INEEL boundary. ⁽¹⁶⁾ See Exhibit No. 4. USGS reports also show groundwater flow, or "conductivity" in the Snake River Plain Aquifer can reach 32,000 feet per day, or 6.06 miles per day. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Contaminates discharged at INEEL have the potential to move rapidly through the aquifer to public water sources.

INEEL over its operating history has received significant quantities of spent reactor fuel from dozens of sources. A high percentage of this irradiated reactor fuel was "reprocessed" using an aqueous process which dissolves the fuel rods in acid/solvent solution that then makes it possible to extract highly enriched uranium and other nuclear isotopes for various United States nuclear military programs. The mixed hazardous and high-level radioactive liquid waste (HLLW) and TRU waste was then interned primarily but not exclusively in underground storage tanks. These HLLW tanks were never intended to be the permanent repository for this waste both because of the known toxicity of the waste, the limited service life of the tanks themselves, and the fact that at the time it was illegal under federal statute. The concrete vaults that encase the eleven high-level 300,000-gallon tanks at the Idaho Nuclear and Environmental Technology Center (INTEC) are known to leak. A 1994 State of Idaho investigation showed that over a twenty-three month period (11/92 to 9/94) about 123,500 gallons of contaminated water was pumped from the tank vault sumps. The investigation concluded that the source of the water was precipitation, irrigation, and leaking tank waste system lines. ⁽¹⁸⁾ DOE's reliance on these failed containment systems for permanent disposal of HLW under DOE Order 435.1 is misguided and puts EDI members and the general public at significant risk. The INEEL sits directly atop the Snake River Plain Aquifer, designated by US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a regional sole source aquifer. Protection of this aquifer is main component to the 1995 Settlement Agreement. ⁽¹⁹⁾

Past and current INTEC HLW mismanagement practices have resulted in massive hazardous and radioactive waste contamination of the groundwater under the facility. This recognized groundwater contaminate pathway represents a significant hazard to the general public and EDI's members just with current contaminate levels. Migration of buried waste contaminates into underlying soil and perched ground-water zones are extensively studied by US Geologic Survey and their report notes: "These zones are an integral part of the pathway for contaminates to move to the Snake River Plain Aquifer. Water moves rapidly through surficial [sic] sediments ..." ⁽²⁰⁾

If DOE's Order 435.1, that will allow permanent disposal in these already leaking waste tank units, is not stopped, more pollution will migrate to the aquifer, further putting EDI members and the general public at risk. See EDI Amicus Brief Exhibit No. 3, page 24 that shows radioactive groundwater contamination under INTEC greater than 60,000 times the EPA regulated maximum concentration level for drinking water. The hazard is intensified by the fact that the U.S. Geological Survey report shows that the top ground level of the INTEC HLW Tank Farm is within the Big Lost River 100-year flood plain, which means the bottom of the tanks are some 50 feet below the 100-year flood levels. ⁽²¹⁾ Flooding of these HLW tanks and the related HLW processing buildings will flush pollutants into the aquifer and endanger the general public and EDI members, since these radionuclides are toxic for tens of thousands of years.

At INEEL, the primary facility for reprocessing irradiated nuclear reactor fuel, also called spent nuclear fuel (SNF), is the Idaho Nuclear and Environmental Technology Center (INTEC) formerly known as the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). The INTEC underground HLLW Tank Farm, consisting of eleven 300,000-gallon tanks with a current volume of about 1.4 million gallons, ⁽²²⁾ is only part of a large complex of an additional 127 HLLW tanks that are part of the INTEC HLLW treatment operations (also called INTEC Liquid Waste Management System). EDI Amicus Curiae Brief filed in federal court 8/2/02 in NRDC vs. DOE (Case No. 01-CV-413 (BLW)), lists these 127 HLLW tanks, their location and what process they are attached too, however the waste volume of their sediment contents is uncertain. Some of these additional tanks that are part of the INTEC Liquid Waste Management System (ILWMS) high-level waste processing system are listed in the Idaho High-level Waste Draft Environmental Impact Statement as a significant criticality hazard due to the high concentration of fissile (uranium and plutonium) material content of the tanks. ⁽²³⁾ NRDC's Complaint to the Court (Case No. 01-CV-413 (BLW)) did not mention these additional 127 tanks nor the HLLW contents in characterizing the INEEL hazards, yet it is a crucial issue the Court (in this USA v. Kempthorne case) must evaluate because DOE Order 435.1 will specifically affect the final disposition and closure of all these tanks and whatever residual waste contents are left in the tanks. Moreover, all the INTEC HLLW tanks do not meet the requirements of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), and therefore do not have RCRA permits as storage units much less permanent disposal units.

The process of closure of these HLLW tanks at INEEL has begun. At issue here is not the need to close the tanks, but what federal statutes and the Settlement Agreement stipulations on buried HLW/TRU waste will be appropriately implemented and enforced to assure proper closure in order to protect the public and environment. The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) issued an RCRA HLLW tank Closure Plan (RCRA/HWMA Permit Docket No. 10HW-0204) for two INTEC tanks. EDI alleges that the Closure Plan violates the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), and RCRA. EDI 1/16/02 Amicus Curiae Brief before IDEQ shows that HLLW units are within the 100-year flood plain of the Big Lost River and therefore violate RCRA HLW disposal restrictions. Although this Closure Plan only immediately affects five HLLW tanks (WM-182, 183, 184, 185, and 186) it will set a precedent for the closure process for all of the 138 HLLW tanks at INTEC. DOE's August 9, 2002 Record of Decision to leave 49 high-level waste tank waste in place will likely be repeated at INEEL. The INTEC Tank Closure Plan violates 40 CFR 191 for disposing mixed high-level radioactive waste in near-surface internment that cannot meet the 10,000-year minimum requirement.

The Tank Closure Plan violates 40 CFR 265.112(b)(4) that states in pertinent part, "A detailed description of the steps needed to remove or decontaminate all hazardous waste residues and contaminated containment system components, equipment, structures, and soils during partial and final closure including, but not limited to, procedures for cleaning equipment and removing contaminated soils, methods for sampling and testing surrounding soils, and criteria for determining the extent of decontamination necessary to satisfy the closure performance standard." (Emphasis added). And Subpart J--Tank Systems 40 CFR Sec. 265.197(a) Closure and post-closure care states " At closure of a tank system, the owner or operator must remove or decontaminate all waste residues, contaminated containment system components (liners, etc.), contaminated soils, and structures and equipment contaminated with waste, and manage them as hazardous waste." [Emphasis added] DOE is currently (via DOE Order 435.1), and EDI contends illegally, delisting a previous fifty-year DOE policy that "sodium bearing waste" (SBW) contained in INEEL tanks is HLW. DOE now says that: "SBW is liquid waste that is generated from decontamination operations of INTEC facilities involved in the processing of spent nuclear fuel and the treatment of HLW. SBW contains hazardous and radioactive materials and is classified as mixed transuranic waste." ⁽²⁴⁾ This is at issue here because seven (WM-108 through WM-186) tanks are classified by DOE as SBW tanks in the INTEC Tank Farm. Delisting of these tanks as HLW tanks by DOE has major implications with respect to closure of these and all other HLW units. EDI contends that DOE's own operator reports show that many of these SBW tanks received "first cycle raffinate." ⁽²⁵⁾ Raffinate is the high-level waste remaining after first, second, or third cycle solvent extraction of highly-enriched uranium from SNF. The State of Idaho maintains that sodium-bearing waste in the INTEC Tank Farm is HLW. The State notes in the forward to the Idaho High-Level Waste Environmental Impact Statement (IHLW/EIS) that:

"Reprocessing at INTEC used a three-cycle solvent extraction process to recover highly enriched uranium from spent fuel. Each cycle created liquid waste, as did decontamination activities. DOE recently adopted Radioactive Waste Management Order (DOE Order 435.1) identifies HLW as liquid produced 'directly in reprocessing.' Idaho interprets this HLW definition to include waste from the first reprocessing cycle (non-sodium bearing waste) and second and third cycles (sodium bearing waste). This interpretation is consistent with language in the Settlement Agreement [and Consent Order] that identifies both sodium-bearing waste and non-sodium bearing waste as HLW. In addition, liquid from the second and third extraction cycles was routed to an evaporator before being discharged to the Tank Farm. As such, these liquids contain radioactive fission products in sufficient concentrations to warrant permanent isolation in a geologic repository." ⁽²⁶⁾

DOE's attempt to delist the SBW tanks defies its own internal contractor documents that show the history of these tanks. For example, the closure of INTEC HLLW tanks (WM-182, 183, 184, 185, and 186) as non-HLLW units shows an annualized history for these tanks. According to DOE's own internal reports, these tanks received both Aluminum and Zirconium clad fuel raffinate between 1955 and 1997. Only after 1997 did these tanks receive sodium-bearing waste. ⁽²⁷⁾ The sediments or heels in these tanks are a result of the SNF reprocessing waste generated between 1955 and 1997 and therefore are HLW defined by NWPA. The State of Idaho and EPA regulators are thrusting a "Risk-Based" closure plan that has a multitude of questionable assumptions without supporting sampling data, and specific limits on tank heels left in place, all of which are not fully disclosed. Specifically, how much tank heel will be left in the tanks and grouted over in order to meet the "Risk Based" no harm criteria? Even more egregious is the fact that the DOE technology development that currently exists can remove nearly all the tank sediments, yet for cost cutting measures this has not been implemented . ⁽²⁸⁾ DOE estimates that about 20,000 gallons of tank sediment heels are in each of the eleven HLW Tank Farm units which would leave a total of 220,000 gallons permanently interned. ⁽²⁹⁾

Fundamentally, EDI alleges that easily exhumeable mixed hazardous high-level waste from the INTEC tanks will be sent to other un-RCRA permitted treatment, storage, disposal (TSD) at INTEC (i.e., High-level Liquid Waste Evaporator (HLLWE), Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE), and the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal (LET&D). This is illegal!

During the tank closure plan review, EDI and David McCoy unsuccessfully requested reopening or extension of the period for public comment pursuant to 40 CFR 124.10 and 124.14. Because of information that raises substantial new questions related to DOE's proper closure of High Level Waste Tanks, we objected to IDEQ's determination that: "Based on our review of your submittal, the DEQ remains confident that the plan for moving forward with the Closure of the first two of eleven Tank Farm Facility (TFF) tanks is compliant with [Hazardous Waste Management Act] HWMA regulations, and it represents full disclosure on the part of DOE to address the operational realities associated with closure of the mixed waste tanks." This statement fails to address the various crucial legal issues EDI and McCoy presented in our "Request for Investigation" some of which include: Decontamination steam jets do not have the capacity (according to INEEL experts) to remove the solids in the tank heels, therefore leaving about 30,000 gallons of mixed high-level waste sediments in the two tanks. ⁽³⁰⁾ Decontamination water/steam jet sprays will not resuspend the heel solids nor remove hazardous heavy metal waste because, as INEEL experts pointed out, they are precipitates of a < 2 mole acidic raffinate; Grout will not mix with the tank heels which violates the RCRA and EPA's Land Disposal Restrictions; Grout will only "roll over tank heels" and sandwich them between the tank bottom, and required sampling of the final waste form to validate encapsulation is not planned or technically possible as identified by INEEL expert's comments; Grouting of the vault completely under the tank is believed by INEEL's own engineers as impossible, yet the Closure Plan nonetheless assumes it, which in turn invalidates the Plan's Risk Assessment assumptions, and fate and transport modeling; The "Risk-based Clean Closure" does not offer sampling data to specify the minimum amount of tank heels that will be left in the tanks to satisfy this criteria. Grouting of the tanks sumps will only partially "float" the tanks causing deformation and possible breaching of the fifty-year-old tanks. Closure Plan Risk Assessment fails to include 400 rem/hr soil contaminate loading for cesium-137 (102 million picocuries/gram), strontium-90 (56.8 million pCi/g), and plutonium (276 nano curies per gram) that are the result of tank vault and service line leaks as required in 40 CFR 265.111; Tanks WM-182 and 183-history shows aluminum and zirconium reactor fuel reprocessing raffinate up until 1993 and 1997 respectively that produced the solid high-level waste precipitate in the tank heels. Sodium bearing liquid waste was only subsequently added after these dates, therefore DOE's claim to strictly SBW with respect to the tank heels is false; Tank heel solids (raffinate precipitates) are mixed high-level waste by definition (42 USC 10101 et.seq. and therefore cannot be legally disposed in shallow land burial as designated in the Tank Closure Plan's "Landfill Closure Plan". Also see: (40 CFR191 Disposal of High-level Waste) and (Nuclear Waste Policy Act at 42 USC ss 701 et seq.) DOE estimates that for the eleven underground tank farm, the heels or sediments will be the equivalent of between 79,000 and 220,000 gallons. ⁽³¹⁾ Risk-Based assessment fails to include the fact that the tanks are some forty feet below the 100-year flood plain of the Big Lost River and the leaching effect of contaminated soil, tank vaults, and tank contents into the Snake River Plain Aquifer. Disposal of hazardous waste is also prohibited by RCRA in a flood plain as previously discussed. The tanks have leaked reactor fuel reprocess waste (according to INEEL experts) into the tank vaults thereby extensively contaminating the concrete vault floor and sides, which was not factored into the Risk Assessment as part of the contaminate loading factors in the fate and transport modeling.

The thrust of this discussion related to the INTEC high-level tanks also applies to the RWMC Pit-4 Remediation of buried waste because the same obfuscation of fundamental statutory and regulatory requirements are employed by DOE.
 

IV. ENDNOTES:

1. Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis for the Accelerated Retrieval of a Designated Portion of Pit-4, U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, April 2004, DOE/NE-ID-11146. Hereinafter referred to as Pit-4 Plan or the "Plan."

2. EDI gained through the Freedom of Information Act voluminous printouts of the INEEL Radioactive Waste Management Information System, and we intend to review this data (related to Pit-4 waste interred ) in coming months.

3. Kempthorene v. U.S.A., Order, Case No. 91-054-S-EJL, March 31, 2003, page 26. It must be noted that DOE attempted to appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court but was denied No. 03-35470.

4. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Natural Resources Defense Council, et al., v Spencer Abraham, No. 03-35711.

5. Also see Environmental Defense Institute "Snake River Aquifer at Risk.," http://www.environmnental-defense-institute.org

6. "OU 7-10 Stage 1 Subsurface Exploration and Treatability Studies Report, Initial Probing Campaign December 1999 - 2000, Bechtel Idaho, INEEL/EXT-2000-00403.

7. "A Comprehensive Inventory of Radiological and Non-radiological Contaminates in Waste Buried in the Subsurface Disposal Area of the INEL RWMC During the Years 1952-1983," EG&G Idaho, June 1994, EGG-WM-10903Also see, Early Waste Retrieval Final Report, J. Bishoff, EG&G Idaho, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, August 1979, TREE-1321, notes that the project was to investigate methods, risks, and hazards associated with the retrieval of 65,000 cm of transuranic waste in the burial ground. "Waste retrieved included drums, loose waste, and contaminated soil. Approximately 67% of the drums retrieved were severely breached. Free liquid leaked from about 6% of the drums, and 5% were externally alpha-contaminated. Although alpha- contamination levels often exceeded 2,000,000 counts per minute, available equipment and established operating and safety procedures protected personnel ..."

8. EG&G-WM-10903, page 1-7, 2-21.

9. 10 CFR 61.55 provides tables of specific nuclides and concentration levels as well as a formula for calculating the cumulative activity level for determination of waste classification.

10. Settlement Agreement, Signed by then Idaho Governor Philip Batt, Thomas Grumbly (DOE), Admiral Bruce DeMars (Department of Navy), October 1995, page 6 (E)(2).

11. Christine Gregoire, Washington Attorney General on behalf of the states of Idaho, Oregon, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Washington, and the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. NRDC v. Abraham, No. 03-35711.

12. Hydrologic Conditions and Distribution of Selected Constituents in Water, INEEL, Idaho, 1996 through 1998, Report 00-4192, US Geological Survey, September 2000, DOE/ID-22167.

13. Kathleen Trever, IDEQ, Declaration, 2/18/02

14. Environmental Defense Institute Amicus Curie Brief, U.S.A. v. Kempthorne, Civil No. 91-0054-S-EJL, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, August 26, 2002. http://www.environmental-defense-institute.org

15. Criticality occurs when sufficient quantities of fissionable material spontaneously (or under controlled conditions in a nuclear reactor) produce a self sustained nuclear reaction. An uncontrolled criticality event in buried waste represents an extreme hazard due to radioactive releases to the environment. Three spontaneous and apparent criticality fires occurred at the RWMC in September 1996 and June 1970. (PR-W-79-038 page 30.

16. Radiochemical and Chemical Constituents in Water from Selected Wells South of the INEEL, Idaho, May 2001, US Geological Survey, Report 01-138, DOE/ID-22175.

17. Geologic Controls of Hydraulic Conductivity in the Snake River Plain Aquifer at and Near the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, US Geological Survey, Report 99-4033, February 1999, DOE/ID-22155, page 1.

18. Geologic Controls of Hydraulic Conductivity in the Snake River Plain Aquifer at and Near the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, US Geological Survey, Report 99-4033, February 1999, DOE/ID-22155, page 1.

19. 1995 Settlement Agreement, page 8.

20. A Transient Numerical Simulation of perched Ground-Water Flow at the Test Reactor Area, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho, 1952-94, US Geologic Survey, Report 99-4277, DOE/ID-22162.

21. Preliminary Water-Surface Elevations and Boundary of the 100 Year Peak Flow in the Big Lost River at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho, US Geological Survey, Water-Resources Investigations Report 98-4065, DOE/ID-22148

22. Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement, December 1999, DOE/EIS-0287D, page C.9-10, herein after called HLW/EIS.

23. HLW/EIS, page 5-206.

24. IHW/EIS, page 1-11

25. Allied Chemical Corp., Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, August 7, 1972, Composition of First and Second-Cycle Raffinate Wastes, Rhdo-4-72, also see INEEL WAG-3 OU-3-13 Comprehensive Remedial Investigation Feasibility Study, Vol. VII.
Also see; other internal INEEL documents show that sodium compounds were used for the purpose of converting reactor fuel rods into a liquid. Sodium nitrate and sodium hydroxide was used in the 1950's at INEEL as a primary part of the SNF reprocessing operation. SEE; Progress Report of April-June 1955, February 6, 1956, Phillips Petroleum, pg.5, IDO-14362; Chemical Processing Technology, Quarterly Progress Report, April - June 1961, page 4 and 15, IDO-14567; Development of RaLa Progress, Utilizing MTR fuel elements, Period ending 2/20/54, page 27, IDO-14292; Status of Development of RaLa Progress as of 4/1/54, page 5, IDO-14300: Laboratory Development of a Process for separations Ba-140 from MTR Fuel, March, 27, 1959, page 14, IDO-14445.

26. Ibid. note # 24

27. Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation Recovery Act Closure Plan for INTEC Tanks WM-182 and WM-183, December 2000, INEEL High-level Waste Program, Bechtel BWXT, for USDOE, page 8 and 9.

28. http://apps.em.doe.gov/ost/itsra...Advanced Waste Retrieval Systems; http:// www.tanks.org

29. HLW/EIS, page 1-17

30. See DOE contractor Bechtel internal comment document on the INTEC Tank Farm Closure Study Final 90%; New INTEC Liquid Waste Storage Plan; INTEC Tank Farm Facility Incidental Waste Study Final 90%.

31. HLW/EIS, page 1-17 and page C.9-13